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1Relay Selection Schemes for Dual-Hop Networks
under Security Constraints with Multiple
Eavesdroppers
Vo Nguyen Quoc Bao, Member, IEEE, Nguyen Linh-Trung, Senior Member, IEEE, and Me´rouane Debbah, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we study opportunistic relay selection
in cooperative networks with secrecy constraints, where a number
of eavesdropper nodes may overhear the source message. To
deal with this problem, we consider three opportunistic relay
selection schemes. The first scheme tries to reduce the overheard
information at the eavesdroppers by choosing the relay having
the lowest instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to them. The
second scheme is conventional selection relaying that seeks the
relay having the highest SNR to the destination. In the third
scheme, we consider the ratio between the SNR of a relay and the
maximum among the corresponding SNRs to the eavesdroppers,
and then select the optimal one to forward the signal to the
destination. The system performance in terms of probability of
non-zero achievable secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability and
achievable secrecy rate of the three schemes are analyzed and
confirmed by Monte Carlo simulations.
Index Terms—Rayleigh fading, security constraints, achievable
secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, Shannon capacity, relay
selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative communication has been considered as one of
the most interesting paradigms in future wireless networks. By
encouraging single-antenna equipped nodes to cooperatively
share their antennas, spatial diversity can be achieved in the
fashion of multi-input multi-output (MIMO) systems [1], [2].
Recently, this cooperative concept has increased interest in
the research community as a mean to ensure secrecy for
wireless systems [3]–[8]. The basic idea is that the system
achievable secrecy rate can be significantly improved with the
help of relays considering the spatial diversity characteristics
of cooperative relaying.
While relay selection schemes have been intensively studied
(see, e.g., [9]–[13] and references therein), there has been little
research to date that focuses on relay selection with security
purposes and related performance evaluation. In particular,
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Dong et al. investigated repetition-based decode-and-forward
(DF) cooperative protocols and considered the design problem
of transmit power minimization in [5]. Relay selection and
cooperative beamforming were proposed for physical layer
security in [14]. For the same system model, destination
assisted jamming was considered in [15], showing an in-
crease of the system achievable secrecy rate with the total
transmit power budget. Investigating physical layer security
in cognitive radio networks was carried out by Sakran et al.
in [16] where a secondary user sends confidential information
to a secondary receiver on the same frequency band of a
primary user in the presence of an eavesdropper receiver. For
amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying, the secure performance,
based on channel state information (CSI) of the two hops, of
different relay selection schemes was investigated in [17]. For
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) networks
using DF, a close-form expression of the secrecy rate was
derived in [18]. In a large system of collaborating relay nodes,
the problem of secrecy requirements with a few active relays
was investigated in [19], aimed at reducing the communication
and synchronization needs by using the model of a knapsack
problem. To simultaneously improve the secure performance
and quality of service (QoS) of mobile cooperative networks,
an optimal secure relay selection was proposed in [20] by
overlooking the changing property for the wireless channels.
Effects of cooperative jamming and noise forwarding were
studied in [21] to improve the achievable secrecy rates of a
Gaussian wiretap channel. In [22], Krikidis et al. proposed a
new relay selection scheme to improve the Shannon capacity
of confidential links by using a jamming technique. Then,
in [23], by taking into account of the relay-eavesdropper links
in the relay selection metric, they also introduced an efficient
way to select the best relay and its performance in terms of
secrecy outage probability.
In the last paper above, the performance study is limited
to only one eavesdropper. Such a network model may be
inadequate in practice since many eavesdroppers could be
available. In addition, the system achievable secrecy rate is still
an open question, whereas it is the most important measure to
characterize relay selection schemes under security constraints.
In this paper, we investigate the effects of relay selec-
tion with multiple eavesdroppers under Rayleigh fading and
with security constraints. Three relay selection schemes are
considered: minimum selection, conventional selection [24],
and secrecy relay selection [23]. For the first scheme, the
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Fig. 1. The system model with K relays and M eavesdroppers.
relay to be selected is the one that has the lowest SNR to
the eavesdroppers. For the second scheme, it is the relay
that provides the highest signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to the
destination. In the third scheme, the best potential relay gets
selected according to its secrecy rate.
We also study the performance of the three relay selection
schemes in terms of the probability of non-zero achievable
secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability and achievable secrecy
rate of three selection schemes. These will first be analytically
described by investigating the probability density functions
(PDF) of the end-to-end system SNR. Then, the asymptotic
approximations for the system achievable secrecy rate, which
reveal the system behavior, will be provided. We will show
that previously known results in [5] and [23] are special cases
of our obtained results. Monte Carlo simulations will finally be
conducted for confirming the correctness of the mathematical
analysis.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND RELAY SELECTION SCHEMES
A. System model
The system model consists of one source, S, one destina-
tion, D, and a set of K decode-and-forward (DF) relays [2],
Rk (for k = 1, . . . ,K), which help the transmission between
the source and the destination to avoid overhearing attacks of
M malicious eavesdroppers, Em (for m = 1, . . . ,M ). The
schematic diagram of the system model is shown in Figure 1.
In order to focus our study on the cooperative slot, we assume
that the source has no direct link with the destination and
eavesdroppers, i.e., the direct links are in deep shadowing,
and the communication is carried out through a reactive DF
protocol [9]. It is worth noting that this assumption is well-
known in the literature for cooperative systems, whether or not
taking into account of secrecy constraints [5], [6], [9]. More
specifically, this assumption refers to cooperative systems with
a secure broadcast phase [6] or clustered relay configurations,
wherein the source node communicates with relays via a local
connection [25].
As in [23], this paper focuses on the effect of relay se-
lection schemes on the system achievable secrecy rate under
the assumption of perfect CSI. In practice, this corresponds
to, for example, the scenario where eavesdroppers are other
active users of the network with time division multiple access
(TDMA) channelization. As a result, both centralized and
distributed relay selection mechanisms are both applicable. For
the centralized mechanism, a central base station is dedicated
to collect the necessary CSI and then select the best relay. For
the distributed mechanism, the best relay is selected a priori
using the distributed timer fashion as proposed in [24]. The
problem of imperfect CSI is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the first phase of this protocol, the source broadcasts its
signal to all the relay nodes. In the second phase, one potential
relay node, which is chosen among the relays that successfully
decodes the source message1, forwards the re-encoded signal
towards the destination.
The channels between nodes i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and j ∈
{m,D} are modelled as independent and slowly varying flat
Rayleigh fading random variables. Due to Rayleigh fading,
the channel fading gains, denoted by |hi,j |2, are independent
and exponential random variables with means of λi,j . For
simplicity, we assume that λk,m = λE and λk,D = λD for
all m and k. The general case where all the λk,m and λk,D
are distinct is shown in Appendix A. The average transmit
power for the relays is denoted by PR, then instantaneous
SNRs for the links from relay k to the destination can be
written as γk,D = PR|hk,D|2/N0 and to each eavesdropper
m as γk,m = PR|hk,m|
2/N0, where N0 is the variance of the
additive white Gaussian noise at all receiving terminals. As a
result, the expected values for γk,D and γk,m, denoted by γ¯D
and γ¯E , are PRλD/N0 and PRλE/N0, respectively.
For each relay Rk, the channel capacity from it to D is
given by [26]
Ck,D = log2(1 + γk,D). (1)
Similarly, the Shannon capacity of the channel from relay k
to eavesdropper m is given by
Ck,m = log2(1 + γk,m). (2)
The system model is assuming the presence of M non-
colluding eavesdroppers. Therefore, by leveraging the wiretap
coding techniques for the compound wiretap channel, secrecy
rates that are supported by picking the eavesdropper with the
highest SNR when considering the other eavesdroppers are
also achievable, which is given by [27]
Ck,E
∆
= max
m
Ck,m
= log2(1 + γk,E), (3)
where γk,E denotes the instantaneous SNR of the link from
relay k to the eavesdropper group and is defined as
γk,E
∆
= max
m
γk,m. (4)
Then, the achievable secrecy rate at relay k can be defined
1In this paper, for simplicity we assume that all the relays can decode the
signal correctly.
3as [4]
Ck
∆
= [Ck,D − Ck,E ]
+
= [log2(1 + γk,D)− log2(1 + γk,E)]
+
=
[
log2
(
1 + PRγk,D
1 + PRγk,E
)]+
, (5)
where
[x]+ = max(x, 0) =
{
x, x ≥ 0
0, x < 0
.
B. Relay selection schemes
In physical communication security with cooperative relay-
ing, how to maximize the capacity of the wireless link to the
destination and how to minimize the capacity of the channel
to the malicious eavesdroppers are two main concerns. It is
observed that, on a one hand, the relay which has a good
channel to the destination may also have good channels to
eavesdroppers and, on the other hand, the relay having bad
channels to eavesdroppers may also have a bad channel to
the destination. Therefore, relay selection depends on some
selection criterion and the optimization of such a criterion is
the main objective of this paper. To facilitate the relay selection
process, we assume perfect knowledge of the required channel-
based parameters. In this paper, the following three relay
selection schemes, namely minimum selection, conventional
selection and optimal selection, will be considered. For the
minimum scheme, the best relay is chosen based on full CSI
of the relay-eavesdropper links, that is the selected relay is
the relay having the minimum the SNR towards eavesdrop-
pers. For the conventional scheme, the selected relay is the
relay providing the best instantaneous capacity toward the
destination [24]. It is noted that to choose the best relay for
the conventional selection scheme, the full CSI of the relay-
destination links are required. Although the above schemes of
relay selection are natural, they are not optimal ones since a
part of CSI related to the end-to-end system achievable secrecy
rate, i.e., either the SNR towards to eavesdroppers or the SNR
towards to the destination, is utilized. The third scheme, as
first proposed in [23] for the case of one eavesdropper, is the
optimal one in view of the utilization of full CSI. It is expected
that this scheme will provide a better secrecy performance as
compared to the other schemes. In the following, we will go
into detail.
1) Minimum Selection: In this relay selection scheme, the
relay that has the lowest equivalent instantaneous SNR to the
eavesdropper group will be selected to forward the signal to
the destination. Denoting Rk∗ the selected relay, we have
k∗ = argmin
k
γk,E . (6)
The problem about how to select the relay having the lowest
instantaneous SNR to the eavesdroppers can be solved by
using the distributed timer approach suggested by Bletsas et al.
in [9]. Then, the achievable secrecy rate for minimum selection
can be generally written as
Cmin =
[
Ck∗,D −min
k
Ck,E
]+
. (7)
2) Conventional Selection: In conventional selection, the
relay that has the highest equivalent instantaneous SNR to the
destination will be selected to become the sender of the next
hop. For the selected relay Rk∗ , we have
k∗ = argmax
k
γk,D. (8)
The achievable secrecy rate of this selection scheme is ex-
pressed by
Cmax =
[
max
k
Ck,D − Ck∗,E
]+
. (9)
3) Optimal Selection: We recognize that, when full
CSI is assumed, minimum selection considers only relay-
eavesdropper links while conventional selection considers only
the relay-destination links. Optimal selection incorporates the
quality of both links in the selection decision metric. In
particular, the relay that has the highest achievable secrecy
rate to the destination and eavesdroppers gets selected. As a
result, the optimal selection scheme is expected to provide a
better performance than that of the others. Mathematically, the
proposed selection technique selects relay Rk∗ with
k∗ = argmax
k
{
γk,D + 1
γk,E + 1
}
. (10)
The corresponding achievable secrecy rate is expressed by
Copt = [Ck∗,D − Ck∗,E ]
+
. (11)
The new selection metric is related to the maximization of
the achievable secrecy rate and therefore it is considered as
the optimal solution for reactive DF protocols with secrecy
constraints.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the three
schemes, we first derive the probability density function of the
SNR of each link from the selected relay to the destination
and to the eavesdroppers. Such the PDFs are then used for
obtaining the non-zero achievable secrecy rate, the secrecy
outage probability and the system achievable secrecy rate2 in
closed-forms.
A. Minimum selection performance
Considering a Rayleigh fading distribution, the PDF of the
equivalent SNR from the selected relay to the destination,
γk∗,D, is given by
fγk∗,D (γ) =
1
γ¯D
e
− γ
γ¯D , (12)
where γ¯D = PRλD. Following (7), the equivalent SNR of the
channel from the selected relay to the eavesdroppers is
γk∗,E = min
k
γk,E . (13)
2It is in fact the average achievable secrecy rate, where the average is done
with respect to the channel statistics.
4Assuming that all fading channels are independent, the PDF
of γk∗,E can be written as
fγk∗,E (γ) =
K∑
k=1
fγk,E (γ)
K∏
n=1,n6=k
[
1− Fγk,E (γ)
]
. (14)
The following lemma is of important when it provides the
closed-form expression of the PDF of the γk∗,E .
Lemma 1: The PDF of the γk∗,E can be expressed in a
compact and elegant form as follows:
fk∗,E(γ) = K
[
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
e
−mγ
γ¯E
]K−1
×
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
m
γ¯E
e
−mγ
γ¯E
=
∼∑
Kχe−γχ, (15)
where
∼∑
∆
=
M∑
m1=1
· · ·
M∑
mK=1
,
K
∆
= (−1)−K+
∑K
p=1mp
∏K
q=1
(
M
mq
)
,
χ
∆
= 1
γ¯E
∑M
k=1
mk.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A.
The PDF of γk∗,E in (15) has an exponential form with
respect to γ making it become mathematical tractability. We
shall soon see that such a form will play a very important
role in simplifying the evaluation of system performance over
Rayleigh fading channels.
1) Probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate: By
invoking the fact that the secrecy rate is zero when the highest
eavesdropper SNR is higher than the SNR from the chosen
relay to the destination, i.e., Cmin = 0 if γk∗,D < γk∗,E ,
and assuming the independence between the main channel and
the eavesdropper channel, the probability of system non-zero
achievable secrecy rate is given by
Pr(Cmin > 0) = Pr(γk∗,D > γk∗,E)
=
∞∫
0
Fγk∗,E (γ)fγk∗,D (γ)dγ. (16)
Substituting (12) and (15) into (17), and then taking the
integral with respect to γk∗,D, we have
Pr(Cmin > 0) =
∞∫
0
∼∑
K
(
1− e−γχ
) 1
γ¯D
e
− γ
γ¯D dγ
=
∼∑
K
χγ¯D
1 + χγ¯D
. (17)
2) Secrecy outage probability: Under the security con-
straint, the system is in outage whenever a message transmis-
sion is neither perfectly secure nor reliable. For a given secure
rate (R), the secrecy outage probability is therefore defined as
Pr(Cmin < R) =
Pr(γk∗,E ≥ γk∗,D) Pr (Cmin < R | γk∗,E ≥ γk∗,D)
+Pr(γk∗,E<γk∗,D) Pr (Cmin<R|γk∗,E<γk∗,D) . (18)
Making use the fact that Pr(Cmin < R | γk∗,E ≥ γk∗,D) = 1
and recalling (7), we can write
Pr(Cmin < R) =
∞∫
0
Fγk∗,D
[
22R(1 + γ)− 1
]
fγk∗,E (γ)dγ
(a)
=
∼∑
K
[
1− e
− 2
2R
−1
γ¯D
χγ¯D
χγ¯D + 22R
]
, (19)
where (a) immediately follows after plugging (12) and (15)
into (19) then taking the integral with respect to γk∗,E .
3) Asymptotic achievable secrecy rate: It is useful to ex-
amine the asymptotic behavior of the achievable secrecy rate,
which reveals the effects of channel and network settings on
the system performance. Different from the Shannon capacity,
which increases according to the average SNRs, the achiev-
able secrecy rate likely approaches a constant limit which
is determined by the average channel powers of the main
and eavesdropper channels. To obtain the system achievable
secrecy rate, we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Under Rayleigh fading, the CDF and PDF of γk∗
are respectively given by
Fγk∗ (γ) =
∼∑
K
γ
γ + χγ¯D
, (20)
fγk∗ (γ) =
∼∑
K
χγ¯D
(γ + χγ¯D)
2 . (21)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B. Having
the PDF and CDF of γk∗ in hands allows us to derive the
asymptotic system achievable secrecy rate, which is stated in
the following theorem.
Proposition 1: In the high SNR regime, the achievable
secrecy rate of dual-hop DF networks under the minimum
selection scheme is given by
C¯min →
1
ln 2
∼∑
K ln(χγ¯D + 1). (22)
Proof: Starting from (7), it is possible to write
C¯min = E{Cmin}
→
1
ln 2
∞∫
1
ln(x)fγk∗ (x)dx
=
1
ln 2
∼∑
K
∞∫
1
ln(γ)
χγ¯D
(γ + χγ¯D)
2 dγ.
With the help of [28, eq. (2.727.3)], we can obtain the closed-
form expression for C¯min as in (22).
5B. Conventional selection performance
Following [9], the PDF of the channel gain from the selected
relay to the destination in this scheme can be given as
fγk∗,D (γ) =
K∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(
K
k
)
k
γ¯D
e
− kγ
γ¯D . (23)
Next, we consider the PDF of SNR for the best link from the
selected relay to the eavesdroppers, which can be written as
follows:
fγk∗,E (γ) =
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
m
γ¯E
e
−mγ
γ¯E . (24)
1) Probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate: Now
we focus on deriving the probability of non-zero achievable
secrecy rate. Mathematically, we have
Pr(Cmax > 0)=Pr(γk∗,E<γk∗,D)
=
∞∫
0
[
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)(
1− e
−mγ
γE
)]
×
K∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(
K
k
)
k
γD
e
− kγ
γD dγ (25)
=
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
(−1)m+k−2
(
M
m
)(
K
k
) mγ¯D
kγ¯E
1+mγ¯D
kγ¯E
.
2) Secrecy outage probability: Making use of the same
steps as for (19), we can write the secrecy outage probability
as
Pr(Cmax < R) =Pr(γk∗,E ≥ γk∗,D) (26)
+ Pr[γk∗,E < γk∗,D < 2
2R(1 + γk∗,E)− 1].
Integrating both sides of (26) with respect to γk∗,E yields
Pr(Cmax < R) = Eγk∗,E
{
Pr[γk∗,D < 2
2R(1 + γk∗,E)− 1]
}
=
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
(−1)k+m−2
(
K
k
)(
M
m
)1− e− k(2
2R
−1)
γ¯D
1+22R k
m
γ¯E
γ¯D

. (27)
In (27), we use the CDF of γk∗,D, which is derived from (23)
as
Fγk∗,D (γ) =
γ∫
0
fγk∗,D (γ) dγ
=
K∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(
K
k
)(
1− e
− kγ
γD
)
. (28)
3) Asymptotic achievable secrecy rate: We now analyze the
asymptotic achievable secrecy rate when the relay providing
the best Shannon capacity toward the destination is selected.
To approximate E{Cmax}, we need to calculate the PDF of
γk∗ =
γk∗,D
γk∗,E
, given by
fγk∗ (γ) =
dFγk∗ (γ)
dγ
=
d
dγ

 ∞∫
0
Pr(γk∗,D < γx)fγk∗,E (x)dx


=
d
dγ
[
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
(−1)m+k−2
(
M
m
)(
K
k
)
γ
γ + m
k
γ¯D
γ¯E
]
=
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
(−1)m+k−2
(
M
m
)(
K
k
) m
k
γ¯D
γ¯E(
γ+m
k
γ¯D
γ¯E
)2 . (29)
We are now in a position to derive the asymptotic achievable
secrecy rate, which is provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The achievable secrecy rate of DF relay net-
works with the best relay scheme is tightly approximated at
high SNRs as
C¯max →
∞∫
1
log2(x)fγk∗ (x)dx (30)
=
1
ln 2
K∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
(−1)m+k−2
(
K
k
)(
M
m
)
ln
(
1+
m
k
γ¯D
γ¯E
)
.
Proof: It is easy to show that from (23), and with the
help of [29, eq. (2.727.3)], the theorem follows after some
manipulations.
C. Optimal selection performance
Considering relay k, we have the equivalent secrecy channel
SNR as follows:
γk =
γk,D + 1
γk,E + 1
. (31)
To facilitate the analysis, γk can be approximated at high SNRs
as [23]
γk ≈
γk,D
γk,E
. (32)
leading to γk∗ ≈ maxk γk,Dγk,E .
For Rayleigh fading channels, the CDF of γk can be derived
as
Fγk(γ) = Pr
(
γk,D
γk,E
≤ γ
)
=
∞∫
0
Pr(γk,D ≤ γγk,E)fγk,E (γk,E)dγk,E
=
∞∫
0
(
1−e
−
γγk,E
γ¯D
)M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
m
γ¯E
e
−
mγk,E
γ¯E dγk,E
= 1−
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
mΩ
γ +mΩ
. (33)
where Ω = γ¯D/γ¯E . After using the identity [29, eq. 3.1.7],
i.e.,
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
= 1, (34)
6(33) is rewritten as
Fγk(γ) =
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
γ
γ + αm
, (35)
where αm = mΩ. To obtain the PDF of γk, we differentiate
(35), namely
fγk(γ) =
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
αm
(γ + αm)
2 . (36)
Having the CDF and PDF of γk at hands allows ones to derive
the PDF of γk∗ , which is given in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: Under Rayleigh fading channels, the PDF of
γk∗ = maxkγk is given by
fγk∗ (γ) =
∼∑ L∑
p=1
rp∑
q=1
KAp,q
(γ +Θp)
q , (37)
where Θp are L distinct elements of the set of {αk}Kk=1 in
decreasing order, and Ap,q are the coefficients of the partial-
fraction expansion, given by
Ap,q =
1
(rp − q)!
{
∂(rp−q)
∂γ(rn−q)
[(γ +Θp)
rpfγk∗ (γ)]
}∣∣∣∣
γ=−Θp
.
(38)
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix C.
1) Probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate: Making
use the fact that log2
(
1+x
1+y
)
> 0⇔ x > y for positive random
variables x and y, the probability of non-zero achievable
secrecy rate is given as
Pr(Copt > 0) = Pr(γk∗ > 1)
= 1− Fγ∗
k
(1)
= 1−
[
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
1
αm + 1
]K
(39)
2) Secrecy outage probability: Since there is no visibly
mathematical relationship between the γk∗,E with γk, it is
likely impossible to obtain the exact form expression for
Pr(Copt < R). To deal with this problem, the approximation
approach should be used, namely
Pr(Copt < R) = Pr[γk∗,D < 2
2R(1 + γk∗,E)− 1] (40)
≈ Pr
(
γk∗ < 2
2R
)
=
[
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
22R
αm + 22R
]K
. (41)
3) Asymptotic achievable secrecy rate: In this subsection,
by using Lemma 3 we derive the asymptotic achievable
secrecy rate, which is reported in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: At high SNR regime, the limit for the achiev-
able secrecy rate is of the following form:
C¯sec =
∼∑ K
ln 2
L∑
p=1
[
Ap,1
{
−
(lnΘp)
2
2
− Li2
(
−
1
Θp
)}
+
rp∑
q=2
Ap,q
{
ln(Θp + 1)
(Θp)
q−1 −
q−1∑
n=2
(
1
Θp
)q−n
1
(n− 1)(Θp + 1)n−1
}]
(42)
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Fig. 2. Probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate of the three relay
selection schemes, with K = 4 and M = 3.
In (42), Li2(−x) =
∫ x
1
ln t
t−1dt [29, eq. (27.7.1)]. The proof
of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix D. It is worth noting that
our derived method for the system achievable secrecy rate (i.e.,
(22), (30), and (42)) is highly precise at high SNRs and very
simple with the determination of the appropriate parameters
being done straightforwardly. Additionally, they are given in a
closed-form fashion, its evaluation is instantaneous regardless
of the number of trusted relays, the number of eavesdroppers
and the value of the fading channels. Observing their final
form, we easily recognize that the system capacities at high
SNR regime only depend on Ω = λD/λE suggesting that the
system achievable secrecy rate will keep the same regardless
of the increase of the average SNR.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Computer (Monte Carlo) simulations are used to demon-
strate the performance of the three relay selection scheme
under security conditions. The number of trials for each
simulation results is 106.
In Figures 2 and 3, three relay selection schemes are com-
pared in terms of probability of non-zero achievable secrecy
rate, secrecy outage probability and achievable secrecy rate
by fixing γ¯E = 5 dB and varying γ¯D in steps of 5 dB in the
range from 0 to 30 dB. It can be observed in these figures that
there is excellent agreement between the simulation and the
analysis results, confirming the correctness of our derivations.
In Figure 2, the theoretical curves for the probability of non-
zero achievable secrecy rate of the three schemes were plotted
using equations (17), (25) and (39), respectively. At high γ¯D,
all schemes yield nearly indistinguishable probabilities of non-
zero achievable secrecy rate with unity value. However, at low
γ¯D, the optimal selection scheme outperforms the others while
the minimum selection scheme provides the lowest probability
of non-zero achievable secrecy rate. Figure 3 plots the secrecy
outage probability for the three schemes. For a given R,
increasing SNR leads to a different increase in the shape
of secrecy outage probabilities. In particular, the curves for
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optimal selection and conventional selection have the same
slope while that for minimum selection exhibits the smallest
slope. This is due to the fact that the minimum selection
scheme selects the relay having the worst channels towards
the eavesdropper group. In addition, this scheme does not take
into account the relay-destination links on the relay selection
metric. In terms of diversity gain, this will not provide any
diversity gain since it selects the relay that has the worst
channels to the eavesdroppers.
The impact of the achievable secrecy rates of three relay se-
lection schemes versus the average SNR is shown in Figure 4.
The optimal selection scheme provides the best performance
as compared to the others. In addition, there is significant gaps
between the capacities achieved by the schemes. In the high
SNR regime, these gaps become constant regardless of the
increased transmit power of the relays. Because of the limit of
large PR, the system achievable secrecy rates approach a finite
value, which represents an “upper floor”. This phenomenon
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Fig. 5. Achievable secrecy rate versus the number of the relays, with γ¯D =
γ¯E = 30 dB and M = 3.
suggests that at high SNRs the secrecy probability remains
the same regardless of how large the average SNR is. We also
observe that the simulation and the exact analysis results are
in excellent agreement.
Figure 5 illustrates the achievable secrecy rates of the
three relay selection schemes versus the number of relays
in the network. It can be seen that the optimal selection
scheme again achieves the highest achievable secrecy rate. The
curves indicate that for a fixed number of eavesdroppers, a
non-negligible performance improvement can be obtained by
increasing the number of trusted relays. This is due to the
fact that when the number of relays increases, the network
has more opportunities to choose the most appropriate relay
for security purposes. The result also confirms that the con-
ventional selection scheme always outperforms the minimum
selection scheme; in terms of secrecy efficiency, improving
the data links is better than improving the eavesdropper links.
This can be explained by the concept of diversity gain. The
conventional selection scheme provides a diversity gain for the
relay-eavesdropper links while the minimum selection scheme
keeps the diversity gain the same when the number of relays
and the number of eavesdroppers are respectively increased.
Figure 6 shows the impact of the achievable secrecy rates
of the three schemes against the number of the eavesdroppers.
Contrary to the results in Figure 5, the achievable secrecy
rates now decrease when the number of the malicious nodes
increases. This is expected because the chance of overhearing
will increase when the number of eavesdroppers increases.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the effects of three relay
selection schemes, which are minimum selection, conventional
selection, and optimal selection (which is optimal with respect
to secrecy), under security constraints in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers. Based on the closed-form expressions
of the PDF and the CDF of the eavesdropper links and data
links, three key performance metrics under Rayleigh fading
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were derived: the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, the
secrecy outage probability and the achievable secrecy rate. The
numerical results have shown that optimal selection outper-
forms conventional selection, which in turns outperforms min-
imum selection. Furthermore, conventional selection always
provides better secure performance than minimum selection,
thus suggesting that increasing the number of cooperative
relays is more efficient than increasing the transmit power at
relays. The simulation results are in excellent agreement with
the analysis results confirming the correctness of our derivation
approach.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We start the proof by exploiting the independent channel
assumption of eavesdropper channels, leading to
fk∗,E(γ) =
K∑
k=1
fγkE (γ)
K∏
n=1,n6=k
[1− FγkE (γ)]. (A.1)
In (A.1), Fγk,E (γ) is the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of γk,E and can be computed according to the binomial
theorem [30] as
Fγk,E (γ) =
M∏
m=1
Fγk,m(γ)
=
(
1− e
− γ
γ¯E
)M
=
M∑
m=0
(
M
m
)
(−1)me
−mγ
γ¯E
= 1−
M∑
m=1
(
M
m
)
(−1)m−1e
−mγ
γ¯E , (A.2)
where γ¯E = PRλE , and hence the PDF of γk,E is obtained
by
fγk,E (γ) =
dFγk,E (γ)
dγ
=
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
m
γ¯E
e
−mγ
γ¯E . (A.3)
Since γ¯k,E = γ¯E for all k, (A.1) is simplified as
fk∗,E(γ) = K[1− FγkE (γ)]
K−1
fγkE (γ), (A.4)
Plugging (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.4) and after arranging and
grouping terms in an appropriate order, we can express (A.4)
in a compact and elegant form as (15).
Since γ¯k,1 6= γ¯k,1 6= · · · 6= γ¯k,M , the CDF and the PDF of
γk,E can be respectively expressed as
Fγk,E (γ) =
M∏
m=1
Fγk,m(γ)
=
M∏
m=1
(
1− e
− γ
γ¯E,m
)
=
M∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
M∑
m1=···=mk=1
m1<···<mk
(1− e−γχk)
= 1−
M∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
M∑
m1=···=mk=1
m1<···<mk
e−γχk (A.5)
and
fγk,E (γ) =
M∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
M∑
m1=···=mk=1
m1<···<mk
χke
−γχk (A.6)
where χk =
(∑k
ℓ=1
1
γ¯E,mℓ
)−1
. Noting that the form of (A.5)
and (A.6) take the similar form of (A.2) and (A.3) in the
revised manuscript, i.e., they are also of the summation form
of exponential distribution leading to the fact that the same
approach suggested our papers could be used to solve for the
generalized case. Therefore, the assumption λk,m = λE will
not affect on the results and conclusions made in the paper,
especially on the effects of relay selections.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Here we derive the CDF and PDF of γk∗,D. Using condi-
tional probability [30], Fγk∗ (γ) is given by
Fγk∗ (γ) = Pr
(
γk∗,D
γk∗,E
≤ γ
)
=
∞∫
0
Pr(γk∗,D ≤ γγk∗,E)fγk∗,E (γk∗,E)dγk∗,E
= 1−
∼∑
K
γ¯Dχ
γ + γ¯Dχ
. (B.1)
9Since the PDF and the CDF are related by fγk∗ (γ) =
dFγk∗ (γ)
dγ
,
we have
fγk∗ (γ) =
∼∑
K
γ¯Dχ
(γ + γ¯Dχ)
2 . (B.2)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Under the assumption of channel independence and then
using order statistics, we are able to derive the PDF of
γk∗ = maxkγk by getting the maximum value from K secrecy
channel gains as
fγk∗ (γ) =
dFγk∗ (γ)
dγ
=
d
dγ
[Fγk(γ)]
K . (C.1)
Plugging (35) and (36) into (C.1), we have [30, p. 246]
fγk∗ (γ) = K[Fγk(γ)]
K−1
fγk(γ)
= K
[
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
γ
γ + αm
]K−1
×
[
M∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
M
m
)
αm
(γ + αm)
2
]
.(C.2)
After tedious manipulation, we have the compact form of the
PDF for γk∗ as follows:
fγk∗ (γ) =
M∑
m1=1
· · ·
M∑
mK=1
K
α1γ
K−1
(γ + α1)
∏K
k=1 (γ + αk)
. (C.3)
Here, we recall that
∼∑
=
M∑
m1=1
· · ·
M∑
mK=1
and
K = K(−1)−K+
∑K
p=1mp
∏K
q=1
(
M
mq
)
.
With the current form of γk∗ , it seems impossible to derive
the system achievable secrecy rate. For that matter, we employ
the residue theorem [31] by first expressing the product form
of fγk∗ (γ) in the following partial-fraction expansion where
in the each resulting terms can be integrable, namely
α1γ
K−1
(γ + α1)
∏K
k=1 (γ + αk)
=
L∑
p=1
rp∑
q=1
Ap,q
(γ +Θp)
q , (C.4)
In the above, Θp are L distinct elements of the set of {αk}Kk=1
in decreasing order and Ap,q are the coefficients of the partial-
fraction expansion, readily determined as [32]3
Ap,q =
1
(rp − q)!
{
∂(rp−q)
∂γ(rn−q)
[(γ +Θp)
rpfγk∗ (γ)]
}∣∣∣∣
γ=−Θp
(C.6)
Pulling everything together, we complete the proof.
3For convenience, coefficients Ap,q can be obtained more easily by solving
the system of K + 1 equations which is established by randomly choosing
K + 1 distinct values of γ but not equal to any Θp [33]. Denoting K + 1
values of γ as Bu with u = 1, . . . ,K+1, we can obtain the following linear
system of equations
L∑
p=1
rp∑
q=1
Ap,q
(γ +Θp)
q =
1
(γ + α1)
∏K
k=1 (γ + αk)
, (C.5)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
By proceeding in a similar way, the asymptotic achievable
secrecy rate of the optimal selection scheme is approximated
by
Copt ≈
∞∫
1
log2 (γ) fγk∗ (γ)dγ
=
∼∑ L∑
p=1
rp∑
q=1
KAp,q
ln 2
∞∫
0
ln (γ) dγ
(γ +Θp)
q . (D.1)
It should be noted that the integral
∞∫
1
ln(γ)dγ
γ+Θp
(i.e., when q =
1) cannot be evaluated in a closed form. To deal with such
problem, we partition the inner integral into two parts
Copt
PR→∞→
∼∑ K
ln 2
[
I1 +
L∑
p=1
rp∑
q=2
Ap,qI2
]
. (D.2)
where I1 and I2 are of the following forms:
I1 =
L∑
p=1
Ap,1
∞∫
1
ln (γ) dγ
γ +Θp
(D.3)
I2 =
∞∫
1
ln (γ) dγ
(γ +Θp)
q , q ≥ 2. (D.4)
By using the fact that
∑L
p=1Ap,1 = 0 and recognizing the
integral representation of the dilogarithm function4, that is,
Li2(−x) =
∫ x
1
ln t
t−1dt, I1 can be derived to [28, eq. (2.727.1)]
I1=−
L∑
p=1
Ap,1
[
(logΘp)
2
2
+Li2
(
−
1
Θp
)]
. (D.5)
For I2, using integration by parts yields
I2 = −
ln γ
(q − 1)(γ +Θp)
q−1
∣∣∣∣∣
∞
γ=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
+
1
q − 1
∞∫
1
dγ
γ(γ +Θp)
q−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
.
(D.6)
Applying partial fraction technique and then grouping together
appropriate terms, we have
I3=
(
1
Θp
)q−1∞∫
1
(
1
γ
−
1
γ+Θp
)
dγ−
q−1∑
n=2
(
1
Θp
)q−n ∞∫
1
dγ
(γ+Θp)
n
=
(
1
Θp
)q−1
ln(Θp+1)−
q−1∑
n=2
(
1
Θp
)q−n
1
(n− 1)(Θp+1)
n−1 .
(D.7)
where A = [ A1,1 · · · Ap,q · · · AL,rL ]T is obtained by
A = C−1D where [.]T is a transpose operator; C is a K + 1 ×
K + 1 matrix whose entries are Cu,v = 1(Bu+Θp)q with v =
q +
p−1∑
m=1
rm; D = [ D1 · · · Du · · · DK+1]T with Du =
1
(Bu+α1)
∏
K
n=1 (Bu+αn)
and u, v = 1, . . . ,K.
4The dilogarithm function is a special case of the polylogarithm.
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Finally, combining (D.5), (D.6) and (D.2), we have the final
approximated closed-form expression for the achievable se-
crecy rate.
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